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UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON: ACKNOWLEDGING
THE SHIFT IN THE JUVENILE COURT SYSTEM
FROM REHABILITATION TO PUNISHMENT
INTRODUCTION
The juvenile court system was originally designed to rehabilitate ju-
venile offenders.1 However, the number of juvenile offenders has in-
creased and their crimes have become more violent.2 The United
States Supreme Court responded to this situation accordingly. For ex-
ample, as early as 1967, the Court dramatically altered the juvenile
justice system in the landmark decision of In re Gault by granting
juveniles many of the procedural protections given to adults.4 Gault
was sentenced to a period of confinement and the Court emphatically
stated that "the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo
court."'5 Many states also have adapted to the changing times by pass-
ing laws reflecting the notion that the juvenile court system should be
1. See Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV.
1187, 1212 (1970) (stating that there was an "underlying rehabilitative aim" to all "juvenile
penology").
2. See Hon. Gordon A. Martin, Jr., The Delinquent and the Juvenile Court: Is there Still a
Place for Rehabilitation?, 25 CONN. L. REV. 57, 64 n.32 (1992) (citing Glenn L. Pierce & James
A. Fox, Recent Trends In Violent Crime: A Closer Look, NATIONAL CRIME ANALYSIS PROJECT,
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERsrY, at 161.3 (Oct. 1992)) (stating that the arrest rate for criminal
homicide for fifteen year-olds increased dramatically from 11.8 per 100,000 males in 1985 to 37.4,
representing an increase of 217 percent); see also Avis LaVelle, Essence on the Issues: Should
Children Be Tried As Adults?, ESSENCE, Sept. 1994, at 85 (stating that the "portrait of the Amer-
ican criminal is changing" insofar as it "[i]ncreasingly ... bears the face of a child," as shown by
the fact that the number of young people arrested for committing violent crimes increased from
66,296 in 1983 to 104,137 in 1992); David Zucchino, Violence: Down but Deadly, Tim J. TIMES
(Racine, Wis.), Nov. 5, 1994, at 1A, 11A (stating that there has been a huge increase in youth
gun violence since the 1980's); cf CLIFFoRD E. SIMONSEN, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICA 51
(1991) (stating that in the 1980's "[c]ocaine became the drug of choice, but heroin, and the old
standby alcohol, had a resurgence among the young people of America"); Richard Lacayo,
When Kids Go Bad, TIME, Sept. 19, 1994, at 60, 63 (exemplifying heinous juvenile violence by
discussing the case of a fourteen-year-old who was found guilty of the gruesome killing of a
preschooler).
3. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
4. Id. at 33-42 (holding that due process requires that a juvenile and his parents must be given
constitutionally adequate notice before a hearing on the issues and must also be informed of
their right to counsel). In addition, the juvenile is entitled to the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination and to the constitutional rights of confrontation and cross examination. Id. at
44-57.
5. Id. at 27-28.
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used to punish juveniles, rather than to rehabilitate them.6 Also, sup-
port is dwindling for state efforts to rehabilitate juveniles who have
committed serious crimes such as homicide because the crime of
homicide evokes such strong emotions.7
In 1984, Congress ordered the United States Sentencing Conmis-
sion8 ("Commission") to establish sentencing guidelines. 9 Pursuant to
this order, the Commission established the United States Sentencing
Guidelines ("Guidelines"). 10 The Guidelines enhance an adult crimi-
nal's sentence based on both his prior adult sentences and prior juve-
nile sentences." Generally, the Guidelines treat prior juvenile and
adult sentences of confinement for more than sixty days alike for the
purpose of determining the appropriate sentence enhancement.12
This principle was challenged in United States v. Johnson,13 where
the defendant argued that due to the basic differences between the
adult and juvenile court systems, the Commission abused its authority
by treating his previous juvenile sentences of confinement the same as
his previous adult sentence. 14 The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held that the Commission acted within its
delegated authority in establishing the Guidelines, and that its deci-
sion to give juvenile confinements the same weight as adult criminal
6. See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treat-
ment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U.L. REV. 821, 821-22 (1988) [hereinafter Feld, Principle
of Offense] ("The trend of juvenile courts is to employ a 'justice model,' which prescribes the
appropriate sentence on the basis of 'just deserts' rather than 'real needs,' reflects a movement
away from a rehabilitation-treatment based model.")
7. See Martin, supra note 2, at 63 n.28 (discussing the example of thirteen-year-old Barry
Massey of Washington State who was tried as an adult for the murder of a marina owner and
sentenced to life in prison without parole); see also Laura Sessions Stepp, The Crackdown on
Juvenile Crime: Do Stricter Laws Deter Youths?, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1994, at Al (suggesting
that society seems to support the idea of punishment for juveniles who commit crimes).
In several recent surveys on crime, many Americans appear to support strong meas-
ures. After American youth Michael Fay was sentenced to caning in Singapore for
vandalism, for example, more than half of Americans surveyed in a Newsweek poll
indicated that caning was appropriate punishment for spray-painting cars. And, in a
Gallup poll released in August, 86 percent of adults favored increased penalties for
student possession of weapons in school.
Id. at A12.
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1988) (establishing the Commission as a separate entity in the judicial
branch of the federal government and stating the Commission's purposes).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (1988).
10. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL (Nov. 1994) (con-
taining the individual guidelines).
11. Id.
12. Id. § 4A1.1(b), (d)(2)(A) (1994).
13. 28 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
14. Id. at 153-55.
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confinements was not unreasonable. 15 The court's decision was
soundly rooted in history and precedent. 16
This Note discusses the case of United States v. Johnson and its con-
sistency with current laws dealing with juveniles and the Guidelines.
Section I discusses the background of the juvenile court system, in-
cluding its creation and development. 17 This section then discusses
the creation of the Guidelines and how courts have dealt with them.' 8
Section II provides a discussion of United States v. Johnson.19 Section
III analyzes the Johnson case and concludes that it is consistent with
the general trend in this country to punish repeat offenders. 20 Section
IV describes the positive impact the Johnson case has on our society.21
Finally, this Note concludes that the trend toward punishing recidi-
vism results in a better society.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Evolving Juvenile Court System
1. The Early Years of the Juvenile Court
The first juvenile court was established during the Progressive Re-
form Movement22 in Chicago, Illinois in 1899.23 The motivating prin-
15. Id. at 155-56.
16. Many state and federal cases stand for the proposition that an adult's prior adjudications,
both juvenile and adult, can be considered in determining his sentence as an adult. See Daniel E.
Feld, Annotation, Consideration of Accused's Juvenile Court Record in Sentencing for Offense
Committed as Adult, 64 A.L.R. 3D. 1291, 1294-95 (1975 & Supp. 1995) [hereinafter Feld, Consid-
eration of Accused's Juvenile Court Record] (stating that most courts that have considered
whether judges may consider the accused's juvenile court record in sentencing an accused for an
adult offense have decided that the judge may consider this record) (citing, e.g., United States v.
Gardner, 860 F.2d 1391 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1751 (1989); People v. Hubbell, 108
Cal. App. 3d. 253 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Brown, 825 P.2d 482 (Idaho 1992); Common-
wealth v. Phillips, 492 A.2d 55 (Pa. 1985)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 5038 (1994) (providing that
throughout a juvenile delinquency proceeding, the juvenile records pertaining thereto must not
be disclosed to unauthorized persons but may be released to the extent necessary to meet, inter
alia, inquiries from an agency preparing a presentence report for another court).
17. See infra notes 22-163 and accompanying text (discussing the historical, philisophical and
judicial creation and development of the juvenile court system).
18. See infra notes 164-211 (discussing the United States Sentencing Guidelines and their ap-
plication by federal courts).
19. See infra notes 212-276 (discussing the United States v. Johnson decision).
20. See infra notes 277-338 (analyzing the Johnson decision).
21. See infra notes 339-349 (discussing the impact of the Johnson decision),
22. This movement describes the period in American history, from the latter part of the nine-
teenth century to the early twentieth century, wherein the country experienced radical changes
as the completion of the railroads modified "economic socialization," and the rise in immigration
and urbanization led to an increase in the social construction of cities. Barry C. Feld, The Juve-
nile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78
J. CiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 473-74 (1987) [hereinafter Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes]; cf.
SIMONSEN, supra note 2, at 7-8 (stating that during the Middle Ages, children convicted of " 'pe-
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ciple behind the creation of this court system was to protect and
reform juveniles who committed crimes.2 4 Therefore, the juvenile
court was designed to deal with cases involving both juvenile delin-
quency and juvenile neglect. 25
Several suggestions have been made for what actually motivated the
creation of the separate juvenile court system. Some commentators
suggest that this system may have developed in response to the
changes accompanying the shift of the United States from a rural,
agrarian society to an urban, industrialized society.2 6 As this shift oc-
curred, Americans began to experience the accompanying problems
of modernization, urbanization, and immigration.2 7 The leaders of the
reform movement, known as the Progressives, emerged to address
tie treason' or willful murder could be drowned, hanged, or burned alive," but that in the early
1700's "people began to express concern about a growing population of vagrant, destitute, and
often delinquent children").
23. The first juvenile court officially opened in Chicago, Illinois on July 1, 1899. Julian W.
Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909) (citing Juvenile Court Act, § 3, 1899
I11. Laws 131, 132 (regulating the treatment and control of dependent, neglected and delinquent
children)). The Act's goal was set forth as follows:
This act shall be liberally construed, to the end that its purpose may be carried out, to-
wit: That the care, custody and discipline of a child shall approximate as nearly as may
be that which should be given by its parents, and in all cases where it can properly be
done the child be placed in an improved family home and become a member of the
family by legal adoption or otherwise.
Id. (citing Juvenile Court Act, § 21, 1899 I11. Laws 137). In addition to its separate juvenile
courts, Chicago had one of the earliest projects aimed at preventing juvenile delinquency. ROB-
ERT C. TROJANOWICZ & MERRY MORASH, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: CONCEPTS AND CONTROL
181 (3d ed. 1983). This project incorporated various programs that sponsored recreation and
campaigned for community improvements. Id. These programs were instituted in an attempt to
reduce juvenile delinquency by providing "legitimate opportunities" to youths in disadvantaged
areas and alleviating the "strain of living there." Id. Other cities also implemented programs,
separate from the courts, which were aimed at reducing juvenile delinquency. See, e.g., Fox,
supra note 1, at 1188-1207 (identifying New York's House of Refuge, created in 1825, as an early
reform program aimed at dealing with juvenile delinquents).
24. Mack, supra note 23, at 107; see also TROJANOWICZ & MORAsH, supra note 23, at 13
(noting that the concept behind the juvenile court, often referred to as parens patriae, was de-
rived from the English concept of the "role of the king acting as the parent when no parent
existed to protect the rights of the child").
25. See TROJANOWICZ & MORASH, supra note 23, at 12-13 (discussing the structure and goals
of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act).
26. Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 693 (1991)
[hereinafter Feld, Transformation of the Juvenile Court]; see also TROJANOWICZ & MORASH,
supra note 23, at 12 (stating that as a result of greater urbanization and emerging scientific
theories of delinquency, the idea emerged that children should be treated differently due to their
lack of maturity and life experience).
27. Feld, Transformation of the Juvenile Court, supra note 26, at 693.
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these problems by offering solutions that incorporated the changing
conceptions of childhood and social control strategy.2 8
This economic transformation was accompanied by changes in basic
family structure and functions which, in turn, had an impact on soci-
ety's conception of children.2 9 For the preceding two or three centu-
ries, juveniles had been viewed as smaller versions of their parents,
which meant that they also were treated much like their parents.30
However, at the end of the nineteenth century, society began to view
juveniles as vulnerable beings in need of protection.31 This perception
placed an increased burden of responsibility on parents to "supervise
their children's moral and social development. ' 32 As a result, the ju-
venile court reflected those Progressive reforms which centered
around children.33
Commentators have suggested that another factor triggering the
creation of a separate court system for juveniles may have been the
ideological shift during the latter part of the nineteenth century con-
cerning the causes of crime.34 Prior to this period, little scientific re-
search had been done to determine the causes of crime and juvenile
delinquency. 35
The classical view reflected the notion that free willed individuals
caused crime.36 According to this view, people were rational beings
capable of making rational decisions. 37 Criminals and law abiding citi-
28. Id. at 693-95 (explaining that "the Progressives believed that benevolent state action
guided by experts could alleviate social ills .... ); see also Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile
Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69 Mr, N. L. REV. 141, 143 (1984) [hereinafter
Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice] (noting that problems such as "urban ghettos, poverty, con-
gestion, disorder, crime, and inadequate social services accompanied the development of mod-
em urban industrial life").
29. See Feld, Transformation of the Juvenile Court, supra note 21, at 693 ("Families became
more private, women's roles more domestic, and a view of childhood and adolescence as distinct
developmental stages emerged.").
30. Id. at 693-94; see also TROJANOWICZ & MORASH, supra note 23, at 12 (stating that during
the early years of American history, juvenile delinquents were treated in the same manner as
adult criminals, primarily with respect to punishment).
31. See Feld, Transformation of the Juvenile Court, supra note 26, at 694 (stating that "children
increasingly were seen as vulnerable, innocent, passive and dependent beings who needed ex-
tended preparation for life.")
32. Id.
33. Id. In addition to creating the juvenile court, the Progressive programs resulted in laws
that regulated child labor, child welfare and compulsory school attendance. Id.
34. Id. at 694-95.
35. TROJANOWICZ & MoRIsH, supra note 23, at 40.
36. See generally id. at 40-42 (discussing two schools of thought, the classical and the positive,
which provide the basis for "past and contemporary criminological assumptions and principles of
delinquency and criminality"). This classical school of thought was created by Cesare Boccaria.
Id.
37. Id. at 40-41.
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zens were believed to be similar in every respect, except that criminals
"willed" crime.38 Accordingly, classicists held the belief that the
proper punishment for a criminal was to give him a harsh sentence to
"unwill" his propensity for crime.39 The classical criminal justice sys-
tem was designed as a device to protect society and force the criminal
to change his ways.40
The positivist school of thought, which emerged during the latter
part of the nineteenth century, challenged the classical view.41 Ac-
cording to positivist theory, crime was caused by external forces rather
than by an individual's deliberate choices.42 The positivist theory re-
jected the traditional view that criminals exercise reason and are capa-
ble of choice and free will.43 In addition, positivists rejected the
classical notion that criminals were no different than law-abiding citi-
zens.44 Rather, the positivists believed that a criminal's conduct was
merely a reflection of the external forces controlling his life.45 These
external forces included the offender's "biological, psychological, soci-
ological, cultural and physical environments," 46 although not all posi-
tivists agreed as to which factor determined or caused criminal
behavior.47 The growing acceptance of positivistic criminology was
probably a strong influence behind the creation of a separate juvenile
court system. 48
38. Id. at 40.
39. Id. The idea was that criminals were viewed as rational people and that invocation of the
"pleasure-and-pain principle" would quash their criminal desires. Id.
40. Id. at 41.
41. Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra note 22, at 475. The positivist theory, founded by
Cesare Lombrosco, is defined as "the identification of antecedent causal variables producing
crime and deviance." Id.; see also TROJANOWICZ & MORASH, supra note 23, at 41.
42. See Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra note 22, at 475. Feld explains that the classic view
suggested that crime was something an individual deliberately chose to do, whereas the newer
positivist theory viewed crime as an end product of external forces. Id. Thus, the positivist view
decreased the actor's moral responsibility for the crime committed. Id.
43. TROJANOWICZ & MORASH, supra note 23, at 41.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 41-42 (explaining that the founder of positivism, Cesare Lombrosco, believed
that biological factors caused criminal behavior, while later positivists believed that sociological
factors were the primary cause).
47. Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra note 22, at 474 (stating that criminology borrowed
both methodology and vocabulary from the medical profession in its "quest for scientific legiti-
macy"). For an overview of various contemporary theories of criminality, see TROJANOWICZ &
MORASH, supra note 23, at 42-80.
48. See Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra note 22, at 474-75 (stating that among the crimi-
nal justice reforms introduced by the Progressives was the juvenile court, a development which
reflected the "changing ideological assumptions about the causes and cures of crime and
deviance").
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In short, the movement toward urbanization, the changing concep-
tions of the causes of crime, or a combination of these factors may
have led to the creation of an independent juvenile court system.
Based upon the changing conceptions of children and new ideas about
the causes of criminal behavior, the Progressives developed the juve-
nile court as a system separate from the adult criminal court.49 In
doing so, the Progressives rejected the use of adult criminal prosecu-
tion procedures in juvenile court.50 Instead, Progressives described
the new juvenile court system as an entity that is "benign, nonpuni-
tive, and therapeutic." 51
Thus, from the beginning of the juvenile court system, juveniles
were treated quite differently than their adult counterparts.5 2 The ju-
venile hearings were informal and nonpublic, records were kept confi-
dential, and juveniles were detained apart from adults.5 3 One reason
the reformers treated the two systems differently was that they were
"appalled" by the idea that children might be given harsh penalties or
subjected to the brutal procedures of the adult court system.5 4 There-
fore, the juvenile court system was not originally intended to decide
whether a juvenile was guilty or innocent; rather, it was designed to
save a child from a "downward career" of criminal activity. 55
49. See Feld, Transformation of the Juvenile Court, supra note 26, at 693-95 (explaining how
the changing views of children and strategies of social control affected the Progressive criminal
justice reforms).
50. Id. at 695; see also Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra note 22, at 476 ("By separating
children from adult offenders, the juvenile court also rejected the jurisprudence and procedures
of criminal prosecutions.") Feld also observed that
[c]ourtroom procedures were modified to eliminate any implication of a criminal pro-
ceeding; a euphemistic vocabulary and a physically separate court building were intro-
duced to avoid the stigma of adult prosecutions. Proceedings were initiated by a
petition in the welfare of the child, rather than by a criminal complaint. Juries and
lawyers were excluded, since the important issues in juvenile court proceedings were
the child's background and welfare, rather than the details surrounding the commission
of a specific crime. Judges dispensed with technical rules of evidence and formal proce-
dures in order to obtain all available information.
Id. at 476-77.
51. Feld, Transformation of the Juvenile Court, supra note 26, at 694-95.
52. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967) ("It is frequent practice that rules governing the
arrest and interrogation of adults by the police are not observed in the case of juveniles.").
53. TROJANOWICZ & MORASH, supra note 23, at 13.
54. Gault, 387 U.S. at 15; cf SIMONSEN, supra note 2, at 8 (stating that in 1682, an example of
the severity of juvenile punishment for the crime of misbehavior was to put a child in the stocks
and whip him). But see Fox, supra note 1, at 1222 (arguing that there was little use of oppressive
criminal procedure in juvenile cases during the turn of the century that could possibly have
appalled the reformers).
55. See Mack, supra note 23, at 119-20. Mack explains that the role of the judge is not to
determine whether a "boy or girl committed a specific wrong," but to ask, "[w]hat is he, how has
he become what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to
save him from a downward career". Id. Mack further stated that
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Before the reform movement, the "law did not differentiate be-
tween the adult and the minor who had reached the age of criminal
responsibility. ' '56 At common law, children under the age of seven
were considered incapable of committing crimes.57 However, once a
child reached the age of criminal responsibility prescribed by the
state's law, he or she was treated as an adult.5 8 Since the juvenile
reform movement, the age of criminal responsibility has increased by
several years.5 9 Currently, the age of criminal responsibility is eight-
een in thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia. 60 This increase
in the age of criminal responsibility illustrates the concept that juve-
nile delinquents were intended to be treated differently than adult
criminals. Indeed, as the above discussion implies, the juvenile court
was originally designed as a separate mechanism aimed, at least in
part, at rehabilitating juveniles.61
[t]he child who is brought into the court should, of course, be made to know that he is
face to face with the power of the state, but he should at the same time, and more
emphatically, be made to feel that he is the object of its care and solicitude.
Id. at 120; see also TROJANOWlCZ & MORASH, supra note 23, at 13 (stating that the prescribed
goals of the juvenile court were "to investigate, diagnose, and prescribe treatment, not to adjudi-
cate guilt or fix blame").
56. See Mack, supra note 23, at 106. ("The majesty and the dignity of the state demanded
vindications from both alike.").
57. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967); see also Mack, supra note 23, at 106 (explaining that the
age of criminal responsibility was "seven at common law in some of our states, ten in others, with
a chance of escape up to twelve, if lacking in mental and moral maturity").
58. Gault, 387 U.S. at 16; see also Mack, supra note 23, at 106 (explaining that the reason
children were treated as adults at such an early age was because the basic thought in criminal
jurisprudence at the time was not reformation, but punishment).
59. See Martin, supra note 2, at 60 n.9 (stating that currently most jurisdictions define a juve-
nile as "one who has not reached the age of eighteen"). As early as 1909, some state legislatures
designated the age of criminal responsibility to be over the age of either fourteen or sixteen.
Mack, supra note 23, at 109. An example quoted by Mack is the New York statute of May 25,
1909, which stated:
A child of more than seven and less than sixteen years of age, who shall commit any act
or omission, which, if committed by an adult, would be a crime not punishable by death
or life imprisonment, shall not be deemed guilty of any crime, but of juvenile delin-
quency only.
Id. at 108.
60. Martin, supra note 2, at 60 n.9 (stating that Wyoming is the only state that sets the age of
criminal responsibility at nineteen, while Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Missouri, South Carolina, and Texas set the age of criminal responsibility at seventeen, and Con-
necticut, New York, and North Carolina dictate the age of criminal responsibility to be sixteen).
61. See supra notes 34-61 and accompanying text (discussing the influence of the concept of
rehabilitation on the early development of the juvenile court system).
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2. The Contemporary Juvenile Court System
Although the original purpose of the juvenile court system was to
rehabilitate 62 the juvenile and discourage recidivism, in the past dec-
ade, at least "ten state legislatures have redefined the purpose of their
juvenile courts. '63 According to Professor Barry Feld, a state's juve-
nile sentencing statute can serve as a guideline as to whether a juve-
nile court is actually serving the function of punishing or rehabilitating
juveniles.64 Feld states that, "[a]lthough most juvenile sentencing stat-
utes mirror their Progressive origins, even states that use indetermi-
nate sentences emphasize the offense as a dispositional constraint. '65
Approximately one-third of the states now use both the present of-
fense and the prior record in determining an appropriate sentence for
the juvenile.66 Furthermore, some states "have rejected the tradi-
tional offender-oriented juvenile court sentencing philosophy," and
have chosen instead to emphasize the adult sentencing policies of ret-
ribution or incapacitation. 67 For instance, several states even impose
mandatory minimum sentences for certain felonies committed by
juveniles.68
62. See D. STANLEY EITZEN & DOUG A. TIMMER, CRIMINOLOGY: CRIME AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 469-73 (1985) (defining rehabilitation as the act of correcting wrong behavior).
63. Feld, Principle of Offense, supra note 6, at 842 n.84 (citing ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-27-302
(1987); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (West 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.001(2)(a) (West
1988); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-1 (1985); IND. CODE ANN § 31-6-1-1 (Bums 1980); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 260.011(2) (West 1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.01(2) (Vernon 1986); VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-227 (1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010(2) (West 1988); W. VA. CODE § 49-
1-1(a) (1986)).
64. Feld, Transformation of the Juvenile Court, supra note 26, at 710.
65. Id. at 710-11.
66. Id. at 711. Feld points to Washington, which enacted "legislation that based presumptive
sentences on a youth's age, present offense, and prior record." Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 13.40.010(2) (West 1990)). New Jersey considers the offense, criminal history, and statu-
tory aggravating and mitigating factors when sentencing juveniles, and enhances sentences for
serious or repeat offenders. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-43(a) (West 1990)). In addi-
tion, Texas considers determinate sentences for juveniles charged with serious offenses. Id. (cit-
ing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.04 (West 1991)).
67. Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra note 22, at 511. But see SIMONSEN, supra note 2, at 49
(noting that in 1969, Dr. Jerome Miller, who was the youth commissioner for Massachusetts,
took radical action and closed a juvenile institution, marking the end of the era of confining
children in large correctional institutions). At the same time, a team of researchers at Harvard
University released a study in which they spent eight years conducting an intensive examination
of minors released from institutions and those released from community programs. Id. at 49.
The study found that the "community based group did worse (in terms of recidivism) than the
group released from the institutions." Id.
68. Feld, Transformation of the Juvenile Court, supra note 26, at 711 n.105 (citing OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.355 (Anderson 1990); N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT §§ 301.2(8)-(9), 352.2 and 353.5
(McKinney Supp. 1990)). Feld notes that certain mandatory minimum statutes give judges dis-
cretion in deciding whether or not to institutionalize a juvenile; nonetheless, if the judge does
decide to institutionalize the offender, then the minimum term will apply. Id. at n.106 (citing
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a. Types of Juvenile Offenses
As stated above, the juvenile court was created on the premise that
a juvenile could be rehabilitated.69 There are two different types of
state laws that prohibit certain behavior by children. 70 A violation of
either type of these laws is considered delinquent behavior.71 The first
type includes those laws that prohibit behavior which also is prohib-
ited for adults.72 The second type includes state laws that prohibit
status offenses, which are offenses that are only prohibited for
juveniles, such as running away from home.73
b. Waiver into Adult Court
From its creation, the juvenile court system has provided a mecha-
nism whereby serious juvenile offenders can be treated as adults. 74
Today, most legislatures have adopted some form of legislation
whereby a juvenile can be transferred from the juvenile court into
adult court.75 The most prevalent method to accomplish this transfer
is through a judicial waiver. 76 In performing this procedure, a judge
will decide whether or not to waive a juvenile into adult court based
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-3-113.1-.2 (1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN § 208.194 (Michie/Bobbs-
Mervill 1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-285.1 (Supp. 1990)). However, some states, such as Illi-
nois, also have nondiscretionary mandatory minimum terms for serious violent offenders. Id. at
711-12 (citing ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, para. 805-35 (Smith-Hurd 1990)).
69. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (concluding that rehabilitation was a major goal
of the juvenile court system as originally created).
70. TROJANOWICZ & MORASH, supra note 23, at 5.
71. Id. at 4. The four key issues that are necessary to understand juvenile delinquency in-
clude: (1) who are the adolescents responsible for the most delinquent behavior; (2) which theo-
ries offer the best explanation of the causes of delinquency; (3) what programs and methods are
effective in controlling delinquency; and (4) what do different groups in our society believe about
delinquency. Id. at 5.
72. TROJANOWICZ & MORASH, supra note 23, at 5 (discussing examples such as murder, rape,
fraud and robbery).
73. Id. The Guidelines provide that "juvenile status offenses and truancy" are never counted
toward a person's criminal history score. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDE-
LINES MANUAL, supra note 10, § 4A1.2(c)(2).
74. Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra note 22, at 478.
Under most of the juvenile-court laws a child under the designated age is to be pro-
ceeded against as a criminal only when in the judgment of the judge of the juvenile
court, either as to any child, or in some states as to one over fourteen or over sixteen
years of age, the interests of the state and of the child require that this be done.
Mack, supra note 23, at 109.
75. Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra note 22, at 498. For example, "[f]orty-nine states and
the District of Columbia use, at least in part, the judicial waiver mechanism." Id. at 504; cf.
Lacayo, supra note 2, at 60 (noting that North Carolina passed a law in 1994 that allows youths
as young as thirteen to be tried as adults). The first youthful offender to be tried under this law
was thirteen-year-old Andre Green, who confessed to beating his female neighbor with a mop
handle and then raping her after having become "infatuated with her." Id.
76. Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra note 23, at 488.
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on factors such as the juvenile's threat to society and the likelihood
that the juvenile will be rehabilitated.77
Another mechanism used by states to waive juveniles into the adult
court system is the legislative offense exclusion. 78 This is a process
whereby the juvenile court automatically excludes juveniles who are
charged with certain offenses. 79 Consequently, "[d]issatisfaction with
the juvenile system has traditionally been defused and tempered by
the existence of exclusion statutes or transfer procedures whereby
juveniles can, either by legislative or judicial action, be removed from
the juvenile system and placed in adult courts."'80
c. Procedure in Juvenile Courts
If a juvenile is not waived into adult court, then the general proce-
dures for handling juvenile delinquents are as follows: arrest, intake,
adjudication, disposition, and aftercare.81 These procedures differ
from those used in adult courts. For example, juvenile court proceed-
ings have always been considered civil rather than criminal proceed-
ings.82 The reason juvenile proceedings are considered civil is because
the purpose of the juvenile court proceeding is to determine the best
interests of the child, rather than the child's criminal guilt or
innocence.8 3
d. Supreme Court Cases
The Supreme Court has played an important role in the develop-
ment of the juvenile court. The Court has protected the constitutional
rights of juveniles much as they have protected the constitutional
rights of adult criminals. As early as 1948, in Haley v. Ohio,84 the
Court concluded that the Due Process Clause barred the use of a con-
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. Violent crimes and other felonies are offenses that are usually excluded from juvenile
court jurisdiction. Eric L. Jensen, The Waiver of Juveniles to Criminal Court: Policy Goals, Em-
pirical Realities, and Suggestions for Change, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 173, 182 (1994). Specifically,
states often include homicide, forcible rape, kidnapping, armed robbery, and burglary in their
legislative waiver statutes. Id.
80. Martin, supra note 2, at 61.
81. See SIMoNsEN, supra note 2, at 29-30 (summarizing the guidelines outlined by the National
Juvenile Clearinghouse).
82. See David Dormont, Note, For the Good of the Adult: An Examination of the Constitu-
tionality of Using Prior Juvenile Adjudications to Enhance Adult Sentences, 75 MINN. L. REV.
1769, 1776 n.43 (1991) (demonstrating the difference in terminology used in the juvenile courts).
But see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1967) (stating that the term "delinquent" has come to have
only slightly less stigma than the word "criminal").
83. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
84. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
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fession taken illegally from a fifteen-year-old boy.85 Justice Douglas
stated that "[n]either man nor child can be allowed to stand con-
demned by methods which flout constitutional requirements of due
process of law."'86
The Court further extended rights typically enjoyed in the adult
criminal system to juveniles in Kent v. United States.87 In Kent, a six-
teen-year-old boy was charged with housebreaking, robbery, and
rape.88 The juvenile court judge issued an order waiving jurisdiction
over the boy and directed that his trial be held in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia.89 The judge recited that
this decision had been made after a "full investigation." 90 However,
the judge did not hold a hearing, made no findings, and gave no rea-
son for issuing the waiver.91 Among other grounds, the petitioner "at-
tacked" the juvenile court's waiver because: (1) no findings were
made by the juvenile court; (2) no reasons were given for the waiver;
and (3) counsel was denied access to the social services file.92
The Supreme Court held that the waiver was invalid and remanded
the case.93 Writing for the majority, Justice Fortas first acknowledged
that the District of Columbia statute that granted judges the power to
waive jurisdiction over juveniles 94 gave judges "considerable latitude"
in allowing them to reach their decision. 95 However, Fortas cautioned
that this statute "does not confer upon the juvenile court a license for
arbitrary procedure. ' 96 The Court did not reach the merits of the
case, but stated that our legal system does not allow waiver to be
reached "without a hearing, without effective assistance of counsel,
[or] without a statement of reasons. '97
The Court warned that a child may get the worst of both worlds by
not getting the protection accorded to adults or the "solicitous care
and regenerative treatment postulated for children." 98 The Court
85. Id. at 599-601.
86. Id. at 601.




91. Id. at 546. The petitioner had previously requested a hearing on the issues of waiver,
hospitalization for psychiatric observation, examination of the social services file, and an offer of
proof to show that the petitioner could be rehabilitated. Id.
92. Id. at 552.
93. Id.
94. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-914 (1961).
95. Kent, 383 U.S. at 552-53.
96. Id. at 553.
97. Id. at 554.
98. Id. at 556.
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stated that the "parens patriae" philosophy is not an "invitation to
procedural arbitrariness." 99  Moreover, the Court found that since
the petitioner was sixteen at the time he was charged, he was entitled
under the statute to certain benefits of, and the jurisdiction of, the
juvenile court.1' ° The Court held that the waiver hearing is an ex-
tremely important proceeding and, accordingly, the juvenile must be
given an opportunity for a hearing and reasons for granting a waiver
order.101
One year later, in 1967, the entire juvenile court system was dramat-
ically changed by the landmark decision of In re Gault.0 2 In Gault,
the police arrested the defendant, a fifteen-year-old boy named Ger-
ald Gault, for making lewd remarks to a neighbor on the telephone. 0 3
At the time of his arrest, Gault was still on probation for being in the
company of a boy who was found with a stolen wallet. 1°4 When the
police arrested Gault, his parents were at work. 0 5 No steps were
taken to notify his parents that he had been arrested. 0 6 His mother
did not learn of Gault's arrest until she sent his brother out to look for
him.'0 7
A petition was filed with the juvenile court but it was not served
upon Gault or his parents.108 The petition did not state any factual
basis for the arrest, but merely stated that Gault was a delinquent mi-
nor in need of protection. 0 9 At Gault's first hearing, no transcript or
recording was made of the proceeding and the complainant was not
present." 0 At his next hearing, the judge sentenced Gault to the State
Industrial School until the age of twenty-one."' Since Arizona did
99. TROJANOWICZ & MORASH, supra note 23, at 141.
100. Kent, 383 U.S. at 557.
101. Id. at 561.
102. 387 U.S. 1 (1967); see also TROJANOWICZ & MORASH, supra note 23, at 140 ("The juve-
nile court in its essential form established in 1899 remained operant and free of serious challenge
until 1966"); Feld, Transformation of the Juvenile Court, supra note 26, at 691-92 (stating that as
a result of In re Gault, the juvenile courts now converge procedurally and substantively with
adult criminal courts).
103. Gault, 387 U.S. at 4. The Court noted that the remarks made to the neighbor were of the
"irritatingly offensive, adolescent, sex variety." Id.
104. Id.






111. Id. at 7.
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not permit appeals in juvenile cases, 112 the Superior Court dismissed
Gault's appeal. 1 3 Thereafter, Gault sought review in the Arizona
Supreme Court.114 The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed dismissal
of the writ."15 On his appeal to the United States Supreme Court,
Gault urged the Court to hold the Juvenile Code of Arizona invalid
on its face, or as applied in his case, as contrary to the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 6 In reversing the Arizona
Supreme Court, Justice Fortas delivered the opinion for an eight-jus-
tice majority." 7
Gault extended many of the constitutional procedural protections
available in adult criminal proceedings to the juvenile courts. 1 8 The
Court refused to apply a lower standard to the juvenile hearing simply
because it was considered "civil" rather than "criminal." 119 The Court
reasoned that even though juvenile court proceedings are labeled
civil, a juvenile proceeding may subject the individual to incarceration
just as in an adult criminal proceeding. 120
The Court first addressed the question of whether a juvenile hear-
ing was subject to scrutiny under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.' 2' The Court emphasized that it was not
addressing the pre-judicial or post-adjudicative stages of the juvenile
court process.122 Instead, the Court considered the issue as it was
framed in the case, namely, whether Gault received sufficient due pro-
cess when he was adjudicated delinquent and sentenced to a state in-
stitution. 23 In deciding whether the Due Process Clause applied, the
Court discussed the historical development of the juvenile court and
recognized that its purpose was to guide and protect children. 124
However, the Court also recognized that as a practical matter, the ju-
venile court system locked Gault in a facility called an "institution" or
"industrial school" where he could be "restrained of his liberty for
112. Id. at 8; see In re Gault, 407 P.2d 760 (Ariz. 1965) (providing that juveniles are not enti-
tled to the statutory right of appeal available to adults) (citing Ginn v. Superior Court, 404 P.2d
721 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965)).
113. Gault, 387 U.S. at 8.
114. Id. at 9.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 3.
117. Id.
118. See Dormont, supra note 82, at 1779 (stating that Gault provided the type of procedural
regularity for juveniles compelled by the Fourteenth Amendment).
119. Gault, 387 U.S. at 50.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 12-31.
122. Id. at 13.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 12-31.
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years."'1 25 Based upon this recognition of Gault's situation, the Court
stated that "it would be extraordinary if our Constitution did not re-
quire the procedural regularity and the exercise of care implied in the
phrase 'due process.' "126
After deciding that a juvenile is entitled to some form of due pro-
cess, the first specific issue addressed by the Court was whether the
state had an obligation to notify Gault's parents of the hearing.127 The
Court held that notice of the charge had to be given to them suffi-
ciently in advance of a hearing to comply with the requirements of
due process. 128 Next, the Court considered the issue of whether the
Due Process Clause required that the juvenile and his parents be ad-
vised of their right to representation by counsel.' 2 9 After discussing
the importance of counsel in assisting the juvenile with legal mat-
ters, 30 the Court concluded that the Due Process Clause required that
a juvenile who may be institutionalized after being adjudicated delin-
quent, as well as his parents, must be informed of the juvenile's right
to be represented by counsel. 31
The Court also granted juveniles several other procedural rights af-
forded to adults. 32 The Court held that a juvenile is entitled to the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination 133 and the rights to
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. 34 In addition, the
Court criticized the State's practice of failing to provide juveniles the
125. Id. at 27.
126. Id. at 27-28. The Court further stated: "Under our Constitution, the condition of being a
boy does not justify a kangaroo court." Id. The Court noted the great disparity between the
maximum sentence Gerald might have received had he been eighteen - a fine of $5 to $50 or
imprisonment for not more than two months - and the sentence he actually received, which was
confinement for a maximum of six years. Id. at 29.
127. Id. at 31-34.
128. See id. at 33 (stating that notice must be given sufficiently in advance so that the juvenile
defendant will have a reasonable opportunity to prepare, and that notice must set forth the
alleged misconduct with particularity).
129. Id. at 34-42.
130. Id. at 36.
131. Id. at 41. In its analysis of the issue, the Court cited the President's Crime Commission
and noted that it had recently recommended that to assure " 'procedural justice for the child,' it
is necessary that 'Counsel ... be appointed as a matter of course wherever coercive action is a
possibility, without requiring any affirmative choice by child or parent.'" Id. at 38 (quoting RE-
PORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, TiH CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967)).
132. See infra text accompanying notes 139-41 (stating the specific procedural protections ex-
tended to juveniles).
133. Gault, 387 U.S. at 44-56. The Court stated that "[i]t would indeed be surprising if the
privilege against self incrimination were available to hardened criminals but not to children. The
language of the Fifth Amendment ... is unequivocal and without exception." Id. at 47.
134. Id. at 57-58.
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right to appeal or to record the proceedings. 135 Although the Court
granted juveniles all of these constitutional protections, it did not re-
quire the juvenile court to exactly mirror the adult court.136 The Gault
court did not address the question of whether the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial applies to juvenile court proceedings. 137
Although the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to an impar-
tial jury in all criminal prosecutions, 138 the Court refused to extend
this right to juveniles in a juvenile delinquency proceeding in the 1971
case of McKeiver v. Pennsylvania.139 In McKeiver, the Court applied
the "fundamental fairness" standard of the Due Process Clause which
applies to juvenile court proceedings. 140 The Court concluded that the
fundamental fairness standard required nothing more than accurate
fact-finding, a process that could be satisfied by a judge as well as a
jury.14' Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun stated that if a jury
trial were required in all juvenile proceedings as a matter of right, this
requirement would bring with it "traditional delay, the formality, and
the clamor of the adversary system and, possibly, the public trial.' 42
135. See id. at 58 (reasoning that this practice imposes a "burden upon the machinery of
habeas corpus").
136. See id. at 27 (stating that while due process requirements in the juvenile courts may
introduce a degree of regularity, such requirements are not intended to displace the current
system). In Gault, Justice Harlan concurred in part and dissented in part, joined by Justice Stew-
art. Id. at 65. Justice Stewart also wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which he stated: "[Ilt
certainly does not follow that notice of a juvenile hearing must be framed with all the technical
niceties of a criminal indictment." Id. at 81 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 1.
138. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). In Duncan, the Court emphasized that
the right to a trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice. Id.
139. 403 U.S. 528 (1971). This case involved three juveniles. McKeiver was a sixteen-year-old
in Pennsylvania charged with robbery, larceny, and receiving stolen goods. Id. at 534. The court
denied his request for a jury trial at his adjudication hearing. Id. at 535. Another juvenile,
Edward Terry, a fifteen-year-old from Pennsylvania, was charged with assault and battery of a
police officer together with conspiracy. Id. Terry's request for a jury trial was also denied. Id.
In North Carolina, Barbara Burrus and approximately forty-five other black children ranging in
age from eleven to fifteen were issued juvenile court summonses and charged with willfully im-
peding traffic. Id. at 536. These charges arose out of a series of incidents where black adults and
children protested against the schools. Id. Burrus requested a jury trial and also was denied. Id.
140. Id. at 541. All of the parties agreed that the Due Process standard applicable to juvenile
proceedings was "fundamental fairness," as developed in Gault and Winship, with an emphasis
on factfinding procedures. Id. at 543; see also Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 28,
at 159 (observing that the Court did not rely on the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial which
is applicable to the states through incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment).
141. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545. "But one cannot say that in our legal system the jury is a
necessary component of accurate factfinding." Id. at 543.
142. Id. at 550.
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The Court concluded that the right to a jury was not fundamental and
was therefore not required in juvenile proceedings. 143
Even though McKeiver limited the protections available to
juveniles, many other procedural protections have attached to juvenile
court proceedings since Gault.144 For example, in In re Winship145 the
Court held that the Due Process Clause required proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt in juvenile proceedings, rather than lower civil stan-
dards.1 46 The Court first explained that the reasonable doubt
standard is a device that is utilized to ensure that innocent people are
not condemned.1 47 In arriving at its conclusion, the Court emphasized
the following interests which are protected by the higher standard: (1)
the youth's strong interest in preventing the loss of his liberty; (2) soci-
ety's concern for not convicting an accused where reasonable doubt
exists; and 3) the need to ensure the community of the fairness of the
criminal law.148
However, juveniles are treated somewhat differently in pre-trial de-
tention matters. In the 1984 case of Schall v. Martin,149 the Supreme
Court upheld preventive detention of juveniles, reasoning that the
prevention of pre-trial crime is a compelling social goal.150 In Schall, a
fourteen-year-old named Martin was charged with first-degree rob-
bery, second-degree assault, and criminal possession of a weapon. 51
These charges were based upon an incident wherein Martin hit an-
other youth on the head with a loaded gun and stole his jacket and
143. Id. Contra Duncan v. Louisiana, 39 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding that the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury is applicable to the states because it is deemed fundamental).
144. See supra note 4 (discussing the constitutional protections afforded to juveniles in Gault).
145. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). In this case, a twelve-year-old boy was found guilty, by a preponder-
ance of evidence, of violating section 744(b) of the New York Family Court Act, the equivalent
of the crime of larceny if committed by an adult. Id. at 360 (citing N.Y. FAM. Cr. Acr § 744(b)
(McKinney 1962), which sets forth the evidentiary requirements for juvenile court hearings).
146. Id. at 368. The Supreme Court did not find the reasoning of the New York Court of
Appeals convincing. Id. at 365. The appellate court reasoned that a juvenile finding of delin-
quency is not a conviction, that it does not affect any right or privilege, that it results from
confidential proceedings, and that such proceedings are not intended to punish the juvenile. Id.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court emphasized that Gault explicitly held that Due Process cannot
be "obviated" where a juvenile can be found delinquent and lose his liberty for years. Id. at 366.
The Court also rejected the appellate court's conclusion that there is only a "tenuous difference"
between the standards of reasonable doubt and preponderance of the evidence. Id.
147. Id. at 364.
148. Id. In Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975), the Court held that the Fifth Amendment ban
on double jeopardy applies to delinquency proceedings in the same manner as it applies to adult
criminal proceedings. Id. at 529. This case involved the prosecution of a seventeen-year-old boy
in a criminal court after adjudicatory proceedings had been held in juvenile court. Id. at 519.
149. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).




sneakers. 152 The state charged another fourteen-year-old, Rosario,
with attempted first-degree robbery and second-degree assault where
he and four others tried to rob two men, putting a gun to the head of
one and beating the other with a stick. 153 A third fourteen-year-old,
Morgan, was charged with attempted robbery and attempted grand
larceny based upon an incident where he and another boy tried to
steal money from a fourteen-year-old girl and her brother by threat-
ening to blow their heads off.' 54 At issue on appeal was the constitu-
tionality of a provision of the New York Family Court Act 55 that
authorized pretrial detention of an accused juvenile delinquent based
upon a finding of serious risk that the juvenile would commit a crime
before returning to court.' 56 The juveniles who had been detained
argued that this provision violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 57
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, first noted that juvenile
proceedings must comport with the "fundamental fairness" standard
required by the Due Process Clause. 158 Rehnquist reasoned that the
states must sometimes keep juveniles in custody in accordance with its
role as parens patriae to preserve and protect the welfare of the
child. 159 A child's interest in freedom from institutional restraints is
more limited than adults because, unlike adults, children are consid-
ered incapable of caring for themselves and are always subject to
some form of custody, whether parental or state custody.' 60 The
Court also concluded that the state had a "legitimate and compelling
state interest in protecting the community from crime.' 61 Rehnquist
then noted that juveniles are already given notice, a hearing, a state-
ment of facts, reasons as to why they are being detained, and a formal
probable cause hearing. 162 In holding that juveniles could constitu-
152. Id. at 257.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See N.Y. FAM. Cr. Act § 320.5(3)(b) (McKinney 1975) (providing that pretrial detention
of a juvenile may be warranted where the juvenile commits a crime before returning to court).
156. Schall, 467 U.S. at 253.
157. Id. at 253.
158. Id. at 263 (citing Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 531 (1975); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528, 543 (1971)).
159. Id. at 265.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 264 (quoting DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 155). Justice Rehnquist cited a
statistic by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that in 1982, juveniles under sixteen years of age
accounted for 7.5 percent of all arrests for violent crime and 19.9 percent of all arrests for violent
and serious property crimes combined. Id. at 265 n.14 (citing U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, FED.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 176-77 (1982)).
162. Id.
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tionally be detained, the majority indicated that juveniles received
enough protections to ensure that they are not erroneously deprived
of their liberty.163
B. The United States Sentencing Commission
In 1984, Congress established the United States Sentencing Corn-
mission' 6 to promulgate guidelines for federal judges to follow when
sentencing criminals. 165 Congress expressly granted this authority to
the Commission as an independent agency.166 The Commission was
authorized to consider whether, and to what extent, a defendant's
prior criminal history is relevant in establishing guidelines as a sen-
tencing structure. 167
Since the Commission is an administrative agency, it is important to
note some basic principles of administrative law. First, when Congress
has "spoken unambiguously on a matter, the agency must give effect
to the intent of Congress.' 168 However, where the intent of Congress
is not clear, the court must defer to the agency interpretation unless
the agency interpretation is clearly in conflict with congressional
intent. 69
Congress authorized the Commission to establish these sentencing
guidelines, in part, to eliminate the discretionary sentencing system
which was previously in place.170 This system was considered to be
163. Id. at 274-81.
164. See 28 U.S.C § 991(a) (1994) (establishing and setting forth the purposes of the Commis-
sion). The Commission was established as an independent commission in the judicial branch of
the United States with seven voting members. Id. At least three of the members must be fed-
eral judges and no more than four can be members of the same political party. Id.
165. 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1994).
166. 28 U.S.C. § 994 (d) states:
The Commission in establishing categories of defendants for use in the guidelines and
policy statements governing the imposition of sentences.., shall consider whether the
following matters, among others, with respect to a defendant, have any relevance to the
nature, extent and place of service, or other incidents of an appropriate sentence, and
shall take them into account only to the extent they do have relevance-
(10) criminal history; and
(11) degree of dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood ....
Id.; see generally Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L.
REV. 1471 (1993) (arguing that the Guidelines place too much power in the hands of the prose-
cutor and take too much discretion away from federal judges).
167. See United States v. Doe, 934 F.2d 353, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert denied, 502 U.S. 896
(1991) (holding that a district court does not have the authority to arbitrarily issue a sentence
below the statutory guidelines).
168. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
169. Id.
170. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989) ("For almost a century, the Federal
Government employed in criminal cases a system of indeterminate sentencing.").
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permeated by judicial bias and abuse of judicial power.171 Congress
wanted to ensure that similarly situated criminal defendants received
equal sentencing treatment in the courts.172 The Guidelines at-
tempted to achieve three goals: 1) general deterrence; 2) punishment;
and 3) incapacitation. 173 In establishing the Guidelines, Congress was
particularly concerned with punishing recidivism. 174
1. The Guidelines
"The adoption in 1987 by Congress of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines ... and its supporting jurisprudence are indicative of soci-
ety's embrace of the punitive mode of criminal justice. ' 175 The inde-
terminate sentencing previously in place occurred largely because of
the notion held by courts that a criminal offender could be rehabili-
tated.176 However, the Senate Report on the 1984 legislation 77 made
reference to the "outmoded rehabilitation model.' 78 "The modern
case against the rehabilitative ideal has been in the making at least
since the years immediately preceding [World War] II.' 79 At least
171. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3235 (stating that the goal of sentencing reform was to eliminate the unjustifiable sentencing
disparity which existed in the courts).
172. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 166, at 51, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3235
(stating that the guidelines are intended to make each sentence fair when compared to all other
sentences for the same crime); see also 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1994), which states that one of
the purposes of the United States Sentencing Commission is to
establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system that
... provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding un-
warranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit
individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken
into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices.
Id.
173. United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1208 (11th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 494 U.S.
1083 (1990); see also Martin, supra note 2, at 58-59 (stating that after the Guidelines were estab-
lished, rehabilitation was no longer a factor in sentencing).
174. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 10,
§ 4A1.1 (delegating under the title "Criminal History Category," a certain number of points to
be added to a person's criminal history score based upon prior incarcerations). A recidivist is
generally defined as "a habitual criminal" and "a criminal repeater often subject to extended
terms of imprisonment under habitual offender statutes." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (6th
ed. 1990); cf. Rene Lynch, Public Defender Tests 3-Strikes Law, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1994, at B3
(commenting that "[slupporters hail the 'three strikes' law as a way to crack down on repeat
offenders").
175. Martin, supra note 2, at 58 (emphasis added).
176. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989).
177. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 166, at 51, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3221.
178. Id. (citing Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 366).
179. FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 31 (1981). Allen
states that the modem rehabilitative ideal rests on three "principal propositions": (1) the ideal is
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one commentator has argued that under the Guidelines, rehabilitation
is no longer a factor to be considered in determining an appropriate
sentence. 180
Section 994(a) of the Sentencing Reform Act delegates broad au-
thority to the Sentencing Commission. 18' However, "Ii]f Congress
disagrees with the [G]uidelines or policy statements promulgated by
the [C]ommission, it can revoke them at any time."'1 82 Based on its
delegated authority, the Sentencing Commission concluded that a de-
fendant's criminal history, including his previous juvenile adjudica-
tions, is relevant in determining an appropriate sentence. 83 Juvenile
adjudications have long been considered part of an adult defendant's
criminal history under both state and federal laws.184 One example is
the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 85 which authorizes prior juvenile
adjudications to be considered in sentencing. 86
The Guidelines classify offenses into forty-three different categories
of severity187 and six different criminal history categories. 8 8 After the
category of severity is determined, the sentencing judge allocates a
certain number of points depending upon which criminal history cate-
gory the defendant falls within.' 89 Under the Guidelines, a juvenile
sentence of at least sixty days warrants the same number of points to
be added to a defendant's criminal history score as an adult sentence
a threat to political values of free societies; (2) the ideal is "peculiarly vulnerable to debasement
and the serving of unintended and unexpressed social ends; and (3) the ideal is "lacking" for
some unknown reason. Id. at 33-34.
180. Id.
181. Appellee's Brief at 9, United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (No. 93-
3140) (citing Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 393-94).
182. Id. (citing Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 393-94).
183. The Guidelines provide, in relevant part:
If the defendant was convicted as an adult and received a sentence of imprisonment
exceeding one year and one month, add three points under § 4A1.1(b) for each such
sentence .... In any other case ... [a]dd 2 points under § 4A1.1(b) for each adult or
juvenile sentence to confinement of at least sixty days if the defendant was released
from confinement within five years of his commencement of the instant offense;.., add
1 point under § 4A1.1(c) for each adult or juvenile sentence imposed within five years
of the defendant's commencement of the instant offense not covered in (A).
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 10, § 4A1.2(d).
184. See supra note 16 (citing state and federal cases where courts have applied statutes that
allow them to consider juvenile adjudications in determining sentences of adult criminal
defendants).
185. 18 U.S.C. § 5038(a)(2) (1984).
186. Id.





of at least sixty days.190 The only exception is that a sentence of juve-
nile confinement of more than sixty days issued more than five years
prior to the current sentencing is not counted,191 while an adult sen-
tence issued more than ten years prior to the current sentencing is not
counted.192 However, the Guidelines still give the trial judge some
sentencing discretion by allowing him to depart downward on the
chart when he believes that the defendant's criminal history score
over-represents his criminal propensities. 93 The Guidelines do not
establish a ceiling on the amount of points an adult may acquire from
a previous juvenile record. 94 In establishing the Guidelines, Congress
looked to the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines as a model.195 How-
ever, the Minnesota guidelines specifically cap the amount of points
that an adult may accumulate based on his prior criminal history. 96
2. Case Law Interpreting the Guidelines
In 1989, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to rule on the con-
stitutionality of the Guidelines. 197 In United States v. Mistretta,198 the
defendant argued that the Guidelines were unconstitutional because
they were contrary to the separation of powers doctrine. 199 There-
fore, the Court began its analysis by acknowledging the general princi-
ple that Congress cannot delegate its legislative power to another
branch of government,20 0 but may obtain assistance from the other
branches. 20' Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, concluded
that the delegation of authority to the Commission was "sufficiently
190. Id. § 4A1.2(d).
191. Id. § 4A1.2(d)(2).
192. Id. § 4A1.1(b).
193. Section 4A1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines states as follows:
§ 4A1.3 Adequacy of Criminal History Category (Policy Statement) If reliable informa-
tion indicates that the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the serious-
ness of the defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will
commit other crimes, the court may consider imposing a sentence departing from the
otherwise applicable guideline range.
Id.; see also Susan E. Ellingstad, Note, The Sentencing Guidelines: Downward Departure Based
on a Defendant's Extraordinary Family Ties and Responsibilities, 76 MiNN. L. REv. 957 (arguing
that courts should be allowed to consider a defendant's family responsibilities when imposing a
sentence under the Guidelines).
194. Dormont, supra note 82, at 1773-1774.
195. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 166, at 62, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3245.
196. MINN. STAT. ANN. app. § 244(II)(B)(4) (West 1992).
197. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 370.
200. Id. at 371-72 (citing Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892)).
201. Id. at 372.
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specific and detailed" so as not to render it unconstitutional.20 2 The
Court held that Congress did not violate separation of powers in dele-
gating the authority to the Commission to establish the Guidelines. 203
In United States v. Williams,2° 4 the Ninth Circuit held that a sentenc-
ing court may enhance a sentence under the Guidelines even if a juve-
nile sentence was imposed without a jury trial.20 5 Williams argued that
even though a bench trial was valid for use in a juvenile adjudication
of delinquency, it should not be valid to enhance his sentence as an
adult.206 The court noted that at the time of his juvenile adjudications,
Williams had procedural safeguards such as the right to counsel and
cross-examination and, therefore, the enhancement of his sentence
based upon his prior juvenile adjudications did not violate his due pro-
cess rights.207
Williams also argued that the court erroneously categorized his ju-
venile sentence as one of imprisonment under the Guidelines because
he was only sentenced to a juvenile hall. 208 The court noted that
although the general purpose of juvenile sentencing is to rehabilitate a
juvenile, Williams was nonetheless deprived of his liberty through his
placement in the juvenile hall. 209 The court stated that the judge was
not required to look at the purpose behind the sentencing, only to the
act of confinement itself.210 The court concluded that the sentencing
judge had properly looked to the prior instances of juvenile confine-
ment and upheld Williams' sentence.211
202. Id. at 374. The Court gave the following reasons to support its conclusion that Congress
delegated sufficiently specific authority to the Commission: (1) Congress charged the Commis-
sion with three specific goals; (2) Congress specified the purposes which the Commission was to
follow; (3) Congress "prescribed the specific tool - the guidelines system - for the commission
to use in regulating sentencing;" (4) Congress directed the commission to consider seven factors
regarding offense categories; and (5) Congress provided detailed guidance to the Commission
about offenders and their characteristics. Id. at 374-76.
203. Id. at 374.
204. 891 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1989). In Williams, the defendant pled guilty to bank robbery. Id.
at 213. Williams was assigned an offense level of seventeen and a criminal history category level
of ten. Id. Four of Williams' criminal history points were the result of two prior juvenile adjudi-
cations, both of which were for the crime of bank robbery. Id.
205. Id. at 215.
206. Id. at 214.
207. Id. at 215.
208. Id. at 215-16.
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II. SUBJECT OPINION: UNITED STATES V. JOHNSOA 212
A. Facts
In the District of Columbia on January 15, 1993, Reco Vondell
Johnson pled guilty to possession of fifty grams or more of cocaine
base with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) 213
and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). 214 The statutory penalty for this crime is im-
prisonment for 120 months to life.215 In return for his guilty plea, the
government dismissed the remaining two counts against Johnson.216
The remaining two counts were the distribution of cocaine base in vio-
lation of 21 U.S.C. § 841,217 and possession with intent to distribute
drugs within 1000 feet of a school in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860(a). 218
At the time Johnson committed these crimes and became subject to
sentencing, he was nineteen years old.219
Under the Guidelines, Johnson was assigned an offense level of
twenty-nine and fell into criminal history category number five, such
that the lines of the sentencing table intersected at a sentence of im-
prisonment between 140 and 175 months.220 Johnson received seven
points for prior juvenile adjudications and one point for a prior adult
conviction.221 Johnson also received an additional two points because
he committed the current offense less than two years after his release
from custody for his most recent juvenile adjudication. 222 One of
Johnson's juvenile adjudications took place when he was fourteen and
arose out of his involvement in a fight at school.223
Under the Guidelines, the court was authorized to consider John-
son's juvenile history and, therefore, nine out of Johnson's ten points
were for juvenile offenses. 22 4 Johnson challenged the Commission's
212. 28 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
213. The provision states, in relevant part: "[I]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally ... to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense a controlled substance .... 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1994).
214. Under this section, "any person violating subsection (a) which involves [fifty] grams or
more of a mixture or substance described in clause (ii) which contains cocaine base ... such
person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years or
more than life .... 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(A)(iii) (1994).
215. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1994).
216. Johnson, 28 F.3d at 153 n.1.
217. Id.
218. This statute relates to the offense and punishment for distribution of cocaine within 1,000
feet of a school. 21 U.S.C. § 860 (1994).




223. Id. at 157.
224. Id. at 153.
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authority to use his juvenile records to determine his criminal history
category, noting that a juvenile sixty-day sentence of confinement
gave him the same number of points as an adult sentence of the same
duration.225
B. Procedural History
Johnson pled guilty to possession of cocaine base with intent to de-
liver on January 15, 1993.226 On May 6, 1993, the appellant filed a
thirteen-page sentencing memorandum urging the district court to dis-
regard his juvenile adjudications in determining the appropriate sen-
tence.227 On July 13, 1993, the district court issued its memorandum
which sentenced Johnson to 140 months imprisonment, 228 which is
twenty months more than the statutory minimum.229 Johnson filed an
appeal challenging the Commission's authority to use his juvenile
records in determining his sentence.230 Johnson also argued that the
Guidelines reflected a "lack of neutrality with respect to socio-eco-
nomic status and race."'23'
C. Majority Opinion
The appellate court began its analysis by recognizing that the Sen-
tencing Reform Act gives the Sentencing Commission broad authority
to establish criteria for sentencing.232 After noting the broad author-
ity of the Sentencing Commission, 233 the court addressed Johnson's
first argument that the Commission exceeded its authority by requir-
ing that his prior juvenile adjudications be considered to enhance his
225. Id.
226. Appellee's Brief at 1.
227. Id. at 2.
228. Id. at 3-5.
229. Johnson, 28 F.3d at 153.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 153-54 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 991, 994(a) (1994); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 377 (1989)). Johnson, relying upon the case of Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (per
curiam), also argued that counting juvenile adjudications rendered without a jury is unconstitu-
tional. Id. at 153 n.3. However, Baldasar was overruled by Nichols v. United States, 114 S.Ct.
1921 (1994), before United States v. Johnson was decided. Id. The Nichols Court held that an
"uncounseled conviction may be used to enhance a sentence." Id. Accordingly, the Court found
no reason to conclude that non-jury juvenile adjudications could not be treated as uncounseled
convictions used to enhance sentences. Id.
233. Although the Commission did not identify the statutory basis for counting juvenile his-
tory, the court reasoned that this omission was not fatal because the Commission made a reason-
able interpretation of the Sentencing Reform Act under its broad authority. Id. at 153-54.
19961
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sentence as an adult because under the District of Columbia Code,234
a juvenile adjudication is not a criminal conviction.235
The court pointed out that under the statute,236 "a court may take
into account the defendant's juvenile record in determining his sen-
tence for crimes he committed as an adult. '237 The majority stated
that, in theory, the juvenile justice system focuses on "treatment and
rehabilitation. '238 The majority acknowledged that a juvenile who
commits a crime will often have his record set aside after he becomes
an adult.239 At that time, therefore, the juvenile would be relieved of
the "social and economic disabilities associated with a criminal rec-
ord. ' 240 However, the court noted that this aspect of the juvenile court
system is designed for individuals who cease criminal activity after
they become adults.24' The court reasoned that this type of juvenile is
rewarded for not becoming a recidivist.242 The court also noted that
society has accepted the idea of considering prior juvenile adjudica-
tions as exemplified by the enactment of the Federal Youth Correc-
tions Act.243 Furthermore, the Guidelines expressly exclude juvenile
status offenses and truancy from consideration in a defendant's crimi-
nal history score. 2 "
Next, the court noted that both Congress and the Commission have
concluded that recidivism warrants an increased punishment.245 The
Commission's original mandate was to establish categories of factors
bearing upon a convicted criminal's punishment.246 Therefore, the
court recognized an inconsistency in hypothetically ignoring the de-
fendant's previous history of juvenile delinquency.247 Given the broad
authority granted to the Commission by Congress, the court con-
cluded that the Commission had not exceeded its authority by taking
juvenile sentences into account.248
234. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2318 (1989).
235. Id.
236. Id. § 16-2331(b)(4) (1989).
237. Johnson, 28 F.3d at 154.
238. Id.
239. Id.




244. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 10,
§ 4A1.2(c)(2).
245. Johnson, 28 F.3d at 155.
246. 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1994).
247. Johnson, 28 F.3d at 154.
248. Id. at 155.
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The court then addressed Johnson's argument challenging section
4A1.2(d) of the Guidelines as unreasonable in that it failed to differ-
entiate between juvenile adjudications and adult criminal convic-
tions.249 The court stated that as long as the Guidelines established by
the Commission are not unreasonable, they will be upheld.250 First,
the court acknowledged that society responds differently to an adult
offender than to a juvenile offender.251 However, the court reasoned
that since this different response is not attributable to the nature of
the criminal acts performed, the social justifications for treating a ju-
venile differently from an adult disappear when the juvenile becomes
an adult offender. 252 Consequently, the court concluded that the
Commission's decision to give juvenile confinements or sentences the
same weight as those of adults was not unreasonable.2 53 Moreover,
the court interpreted the Commission's decision to treat the two
sentences alike as a "method ...of measuring relative culpability
among offenders and the likelihood of their engaging in future crimi-
nal behavior. 25 4 The court did acknowledge that there are differ-
ences between adult and juvenile court proceedings and that judges
have discretion in imposing a wide variety of sentences on delinquent
juveniles.25 5 However, the court declined to decide the issue of the
nature of Johnson's prior juvenile confinement and how it might im-
pact his sentence because he had been sentenced to a secured commit-
ment center which the court analogized to a prison-like facility.256
Therefore, as applied to Johnson, the court held that the sentencing
calculations were reasonable, but left open the question whether the
result would have been the same if Johnson had been sentenced to a
non-secured facility.257
The court then discussed section 4A1.3 of the Guidelines. 258 This
section allows the trial court judge to depart from the sentence statu-





253. Id. The court noted that this is a rough method of determining likelihood of future crimi-
nal behavior. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. For example, when a juvenile is adjudicated as delinquent, he or she may be placed in
"foster care," "group homes," "residence treatment centers," or "secure prison-like facilities."
Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 156.




does not adequately reflect the defendant's past criminal conduct or
likelihood of committing future crimes. 259 The Guidelines state that,
if necessary, this provision may be used to cure any significant distinc-
tions between adult and juvenile sentences. 260 The court found that
the sentencing court did not commit error in finding this provision
inapplicable to Johnson because he had an extensive criminal history
and nothing in his record overrepresented his likelihood to commit
further crimes. 261
The final argument addressed by the court was whether the Guide-
lines lacked neutrality with respect to race and socio-economic sta-
tus. 262 The court noted that Congress explicitly directed the
Commission to make certain that the Guidelines were neutral with
respect to the "race, sex, national origin, creed, and socio-economic
status of offenders. '2 63 The court observed that Johnson did not "pro-
fess innocence" to any of his offenses or claim that his juvenile
sentences were discriminatory. 264 Therefore, the court concluded that
section 4A1.2(d) is neutral on its face with respect to the above men-
tioned factors.265
D. Dissent
The dissent concluded that Guidelines section 4A1.2(d) is irrational
and that the Commission impermissibly abused its delegated discre-
tion in promulgating the section.266 The dissent initially acknowl-
edged that Congress clearly did not foreclose the use of juvenile
dispositions in sentencing because it had delegated to the Commission
the authority to consider a wide range of factors in formulating the
Guidelines.267
However, the dissent argued that the Commission used its dele-
gated authority irrationally by treating juvenile and adult sentences
259. Id.; see also United States v. Thomas, 930 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 112 S. Ct.
171 (1991) (allowing a downward departure for a defendant's substantial help to the government
but not for factors such as a poor upbringing or other family considerations).
260. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 10,
§ 4A1.3.
261. Johnson, 28 F.3d at 156.
262. Id.
263. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (noting neutrality goals and factors that are to be consid-
ered in determining sentences).
264. Johnson, 28 F.3d at 157.
265. Id.
266. Id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
267. Id. The dissent argued that Johnson's argument failed the first part of the Chevron test,
but survived the second inquiry which is used where the intent of Congress in delegating its
legislative authority is unclear. Id.
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alike for the purpose of sentence enhancement. 268 The dissent rea-
soned that "[u]nlike criminal punishment, which might be imposed in
pursuit of retributive as well as rehabilitative objectives, the focus of
juvenile confinement traditionally has been primarily, or even exclu-
sively, on reforming and treating the offender. '269 The dissent con-
ceded that theory has been separated from reality in the juvenile
justice system. 270 Furthermore, according to the dissent, the "proce-
dural landscapes" of juvenile and adult proceedings differ.271 The dis-
sent argued that because the Supreme Court explicitly declined to
require the full protections that are applicable to adult criminal trials,
the two proceedings are essentially different.272
The dissent noted that a judge sentencing a juvenile may take into
account a wide variety of juvenile sentences unrelated to actual crimi-
nal culpability. 273 The dissent further noted that a specific number of
points are given for all juvenile sentences without consideration of the
juvenile's age or the circumstances behind the sentencing.274 The dis-
sent contended that the provision which allows the judge to depart
downward where a defendant's criminal history category significantly
overrepresents his or her actual criminal history does not provide an
"adequate safety valve" for the problems inherent in treating adult
and juvenile confinements alike.275 The dissent concluded that the
Commission's regulations gave undue weight to prior juvenile
sentences and did not reflect "the design of Congress. 276
III. ANALYSIS
A. Rising Juvenile Crime
Based upon a study conducted in 1992, the arrest rate for criminal
homicides committed by juveniles ages fifteen to seventeen rose 217
268. Id. at 158 (Wald, J. dissenting).
269. Id. at 159.
270. Id.; see also Feld, Transformation of the Juvenile Court, supra note 21, at 695 (arguing that
the practical operations of the juvenile courts differ considerably from the theoretical purposes
for which they were created).
271. Johnson, 28 F.3d at 159. Specifically, the dissent argued that most juvenile courts still use
an indeterminate method of sentencing which allows for greater judicial discretion than exists in
most adult proceedings. Id.
272. Id. at 160 (noting that the Supreme Court has held that juvenile delinquency proceedings
do not require a jury).
273. Id. The dissent stated that "U]uvenile confinement, unlike adult incarceration, is still
largely imposed on the basis of characteristics of the offender, rather than characteristics of the
offense." Id.
274. Id. at 162.




percent during the period from 1985 to 1991.277 Moreover, recent sta-
tistics indicate that juveniles today are not only committing more
crimes, but the crimes they are committing are more violent than ever
before.2 78 Today, people are afraid of many juvenile offenders,2 79 a
sad truth exemplified by the fact that many people wish to see
juveniles punished for their delinquent behavior.280 For example,
studies were conducted after Michael Fay, an American juvenile, was
caned in Singapore for vandalizing property in that country.281 Not
surprisingly, these studies revealed that many Americans embrace the
punitive mode of sentencing. 282 Although the juvenile court system
was originally designed to rehabilitate juveniles, the results of such
studies are indicative of changing attitudes about how juvenile delin-
quents should be punished. These changes are also manifested by the
fact that some states are now designing their juvenile laws to punish
offenders in order to deter future criminal behavior rather than to re-
habilitate the offenders themselves. 83
B. The Sentencing Commission's Authority
Johnson first argued that the Sentencing Commission exceeded its
authority by mandating that his prior juvenile adjudications be consid-
ered to establish his present sentence as an adult.284 The court cor-
rectly concluded that the Commission did not exceed its authority.
Johnson's argument was correctly rejected for several reasons. First,
even before the Guidelines were created, courts faced the question of
whether juvenile adjudications could be considered in assessing an
adult defendant's criminal history. Under both state and federal law,
this practice had long been allowed.285 For example, in enacting the
Federal Youth Corrections Act,286 Congress explicitly allowed previ-
277. Martin, supra note 2, at 64 n.32 (citing Fox Butterfield, Seeds of Murder: Teenage Boys
With Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1992, at A8).
278. See LaVelle, supra note 2, at 85 (noting that the number of juveniles charged with murder
and manslaughter in the United States has doubled since 1983).
279. See Martin, supra note 2, at 63 n.29 (acknowledging that many people live in fear of their
own children).
280. See Stepp, supra note 7, at A12 (indicating that violent crimes arrests of youths under 18
increased by 27 percent between 1980 and 1990).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. See Feld, Principle of Offense, supra note 6, at 846 (noting that states are now beginning
to view deterrence as a part of rehabilitation).
284. United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 151, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
285. See Feld, Consideration of Accused's Juvenile Court Record, supra note 16, at 1291 (citing
various state and federal laws that allowed juvenile adjudications to be considered in sentencing
adult defendants).
286. 18 U.S.C. § 5038(a)(2) (1994).
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ous juvenile sentences to be considered in subsequent adult sentenc-
ing decisions.28 7 Therefore, the Commission's decision was soundly
rooted in legislative precedent.
Secondly, Congress explicitly delegated broad authority to the
Commission to establish the Guidelines.28 8  As an administrative
agency, the Commission would have to act contrary to either the ex-
press language or the expressed intent of Congress for a court to de-
clare the Commission's actions unreasonable. 289 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court recently upheld the Guidelines as constitutional and
rejected the argument that Congress' delegation of power to the Com-
mission violated the separation of powers doctrine.290 In establishing
the Guidelines, the Commission acted in accordance with the express
language and intent of Congress.291 Accordingly, given the statutory
bases for considering a juvenile's previous criminal history in sentenc-
ing and the well established constitutionality of the Guidelines, the
Johnson court properly held that the Commission did not abuse its
authority.
C. The Differences Between the Juvenile and Adult Courts
The majority in Johnson emphasized that, theoretically, the juvenile
justice system was designed to focus on "treatment and rehabilita-
tion.''z92 Certainly, the juvenile court system in America has under-
gone significant procedural changes since its origins in Chicago,
Illinois in 1899.293 However, the dissent placed undue emphasis on
this theoretical notion in reaching its conclusion. It is true that the
287. Id.
288. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a).
289. See Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (upholding regulations promulgated
by the Environmental Protection Agency on the ground that they did not contradict Congress'
intended definition of language contained in the agency's enabling statute).
290. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989).
291. Id. at 374-75.
292. 28 F.3d 151, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
293. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (allowing pretrial detention of juveniles only
after a showing that the preventive detention statute serves a "legitimate purpose" and post
detention procedures are sufficient to correct erroneous detentions); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S.
519, 541 (1975) (holding that juveniles are entitled to the protection of the double jeopardy
clause of the Fifth Amendment); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-68 (1970) (holding that a
juvenile must be found guilty by proof beyond a reasonable doubt rather than merely by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31-56 (1969) (extending due process rights
to defendants in juvenile proceedings, including adequate written notice to the juvenile's parent
or guardian, the right to representation, and the privilege against self-incrimination); United
States v. Kent, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966) (holding that a juvenile is entitled to counsel and other
"due process rights" before jurisdiction by the juvenile court can be waived); Feld, Principle of
Offense, supra note 6, at 821 (stating the ways in which the juvenile court has changed from how
its creator envisioned it).
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early Progressive reformers created a juvenile court separate from
that of the adult court for the purpose of treating juveniles differently
than their adult counterparts.2 94 The Progressives did not want a juve-
nile court proceeding to be considered criminal.2 95 This is exemplified
by the efforts of the courts and state legislatures to identify juvenile
proceedings as non-criminal.2 96 The following are examples of the
non-punitive words used in juvenile proceedings versus those used in
criminal proceedings, respectively: petition versus complaint, sum-
mons versus warrant, initial hearing versus arraignment, finding of in-
volvement versus conviction, and disposition versus sentence. 297 As
these examples illustrate, the basic idea behind the juvenile court sys-
tem was to rehabilitate the juvenile offender.
Nonetheless, while the words remain different, since the landmark
decision of In re Gault,298 the juvenile court has come dramatically
closer in appearance to the adult criminal court.299 The juvenile is
now provided many of the constitutional protections currently avail-
able to adults in criminal proceedings.300 For example, in In re Gault,
the Court required that the following protections be given to juveniles
subject to juvenile court proceedings: the due process right to notifi-
cation of charges, the right to counsel, the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, and the rights to confrontation and cross-
examination. 301
Even after Gault, the Supreme Court continued to give juveniles
the protections afforded to their adult counterparts in In re Winship
and Breed v. Jones. The juvenile must now be proven delinquent by
the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.302 This is signifi-
cant because the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt is used in
294. See Mack, supra note 23, at 107 (noting that the goal of the juvenile courts was to im-
prove rather than punish juvenile offenders); see also Fox supra note 1, at 1212 (noting that
traditionally, the system intended to protect, not punish, juveniles).
295. See Mack, supra note 23, at 119-120 (explaining how the Progressives notably eliminated
the court-like atmosphere and surroundings from the juvenile court system).
296. See Dormont, supra note 82, at 1778 n.43 (noting the non-criminal terminology used in
juvenile proceedings).
297. Id.
298. 387 U.S. 1 (1969).
299. See Feld, Principle of Offense, supra note 6, at 821 (explaining that juvenile courts have
increasingly moved to the punitive mode of sentencing).
300. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 31-87 (awarding due process rights to juveniles); see also Kent, 383
U.S. 541, 562 (1966) (allowing a juvenile offender to waive jurisdiction only if the requirements
applicable to adult criminal proceedings are met).
301. 387 U.S. at 31-87.
302. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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adult criminal cases, while lower standards of proof are generally used
in civil proceedings. 30 3
As the procedures afforded to juveniles and adults become more
similar, juvenile proceedings take on the appearance of adult criminal
proceedings. 304 In fact, since Gault was decided, the only constitu-
tional protection the Court has not extended to juveniles is the right
to a jury trial.305 Based on this analysis, as a juvenile, Johnson was
entitled to almost every constitutional protection afforded to adult
criminals except that of a trial by jury.30 6 Thus, it appears that the
Supreme Court has attempted to close the gap between adult criminal
proceedings and juvenile proceedings.
The dissent in Johnson argued that because the procedures between
adult and juvenile courts differ, they cannot be treated alike.30 7 The
dissent argued that because the Supreme Court has not yet required
juvenile proceedings to be given the full procedural protections avail-
able in adult proceedings, the two proceedings are essentially differ-
ent.308 However, the fact that juveniles are not constitutionally
entitled to a jury trial does not make juvenile proceedings "essentially
different" from criminal proceedings. As the Court held in McKeiver,
a jury trial is not essential to factfinding because it can also be accom-
plished through a judge.309
The adult criminal courts and juvenile courts also appear to be mov-
ing closer to one another in that juvenile courts, in actuality, now tend
to punish juveniles for crimes rather than attempting to rehabilitate
them.310 This has been accomplished through legislative offense ex-
clusion, waiver of the juvenile into adult court, and other state stat-
utes.311 As previously mentioned, these developments have occurred
in response to the serious problem of escalating juvenile crime.312
303. Id. at 365.
304. See Feld, Transformation of the Juvenile Court, supra note 26, at 691-92 (noting that juve-
nile and adult courts now converge procedurally and substantively in most respects).
305. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (holding that a trial by jury is not
constitutionally required in juvenile delinquency proceedings).
306. Johnson, 28 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
307. Id. at 159 (Wald, J., dissenting).
308. Id. at 159-60 (Wald, J., dissenting).
309. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543.
310. See Feld, Principle of Offense, supra note 6, at 821-22 (characterizing the experience of
juvenile confinement as hard and prison-like).
311. See Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra note 22 (discussing changes in state legislation
which have the effect of treating juvenile offenders more like adults).
312. See supra note 2 (discussing statistics and trends indicating an escalation in juvenile crime
and violence in the United States).
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Although there are still some procedural differences between adult
and juvenile proceedings, the end result for sentencing purposes is
that both types of offenders committed prior crimes for which they
paid with a denial of their liberty in a jail or some other facility.313
The victims of these crimes and society in general do not see these
procedural differences as relevant.314 Furthermore, juveniles and
adults are certainly capable of committing the same types of of-
fenses. 315 A juvenile can commit first degree murder just as an adult
can. For these reasons, the Guidelines do differentiate, to the extent
necessary, between juvenile and adult sentences by tying the juvenile
sentence closer in time to the present sentence.316 In treating the ju-
venile sentence slightly differently than the adult sentence, the Guide-
lines balance the recognition that some procedural differences exist
between the adult and juvenile courts with the need to protect society
from recidivists.
D. Recidivism
One major concern in today's society is the criminal who, after be-
ing released from custody, continues to commit crime (the recidivist).
In establishing the Guidelines, Congress was clearly concerned about
the problem of recidivism. 317 To address this concern, the Guidelines
attempt to achieve the following three goals: general deterrence, pun-
ishment, and incapacitation. 318 Thus, the Guidelines expressly em-
brace the punitive mode of criminal justice.319
In Johnson, the court recognized that a juvenile who commits a
crime may later escape punishment as a recidivist upon entering the
adult stages of life simply by not committing any further crimes.320
This person is rewarded for "going straight."'321 However, the juvenile
who continues to commit crimes as an adult is not entitled to this re-
313. See United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1989) (characterizing juvenile
detention as similar to a "sentence of imprisonment").
314. Id. In California, only those juveniles who commit an offense that would otherwise be
considered a crime if committed by an adult can be sentenced to detention. Id.
315. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 10,
§ 4A1.2(c)(2) (noting that juvenile status offenses are excluded from the Guidelines).
316. Id. § 4A1.2(d).
317. See id. § 4A1.1 (describing criminal history as a relevant factor in determining sentence);
see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) (1984) (noting desire to prevent recidivism as one of the purposes
for sentencing).
318. Martin, supra note 2, at 58 n.3 (explaining the goals of the guidelines).
319. Id.




ward.322 Thus, a person is rewarded for "going straight" upon becom-
ing an adult, and punished accordingly if he continues to violate
criminal laws. 323 Johnson is an example of a recidivist. He was a juve-
nile delinquent who became an adult criminal.324 This is precisely the
type of individual Congress intended to protect society from when it
authorized the Commission to promulgate sentencing guidelines. 325
E. Can Juvenile and Adult Sentences be Equated?
Johnson's next contention was that the Guidelines unreasonably
failed. to differentiate between his convictions as an adult and his juve-
nile sentences. 326 The court analogized the institution in which John-
son served time as a juvenile to a prison-like facility.327 Johnson was
sent to a juvenile hall and was denied his personal liberty in the same
manner as the defendant in United States v. Williams.328 As the Wil-
liams court stated, the relevant consideration under the Guidelines is
the fact of confinement. 329 Without question, Johnson was sentenced
to confinement as a juvenile.330 Furthermore, Johnson was entitled to
many of the constitutional protections given to adult criminals when
he was adjudicated delinquent. For these reasons, as in Williams, the
Johnson court found that it was not unreasonable for the Commission
to treat Johnson's juvenile and adult adjudications similarly for sen-
tencing purposes.331
However, the court did not answer the question whether Johnson's
sentence as a juvenile would have been different had it been served in
a less secured facility.332 It should be emphasized that the court could
have used the downward departure provision of the Guidelines here
because, in situations where a juvenile does not serve his sentence in a
322. Id.
323. Id. at 154-55 ("Recidivism, so the Congress and the Commission concluded, generally
warrants increased punishment.").
324. See supra notes 226-30 and accompanying text (describing Johnson's criminal history,
including juvenile adjudications, in the context of his sentence determination under the
Guidelines).
325. See supra notes 319-22 and accompanying text (discussing the curbing of recidivism as
one of the purposes of the sentencing guidelines).
326. United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 151, 155 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
327. Id.
328. See United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212, 215-16 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that deten-
tion in a juvenile hall can be used to infer a sentence of imprisonment).
329. Id. at 216.
330. See text accompanying note 263 (noting that the Johnson majority emphasized that John-
son's juvenile sentence consisted of secure confinement in a prison-like facility).
331. United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 151, 157 (D.C. Cir. 1994).




secured facility, the Guidelines may overrepresent his criminal history
and the judge may take such overrepresentation into account for sen-
tencing purposes. 333 Moreover, the Guidelines explicitly exclude juve-
nile status offenses from consideration in a defendant's criminal
history score. 334 Johnson was not sentenced to an unsecured facility
and his history does not include status offenses. This means that the
crimes considered in the compilation of Johnson's criminal history
score were not unique to juveniles, but instead were crimes that could
be committed by adults. Therefore, the crimes he committed as a ju-
venile were correctly equated with the crimes he committed as an
adult.
F. Judicial Discretion
Johnson's third argument was that the judge should have used his
discretion to depart downward from the Guidelines in his situation. 335
This argument is simply without merit. Johnson did not claim he was
innocent of any of his adjudicated offenses.336 He argued only that
the judge should have departed from the Guidelines in fixing his sen-
tence. 337 As the record indicates, Johnson had a "long and varied ex-
perience in the criminal justice system" since he was fourteen years
old.338 Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the Guidelines over-
represented his criminal propensities, and the judge's decision not to
exercise his discretion by departing from them was not unreasonable.
IV. IMPAcT
If the court in United States v. Johnson had held the Guidelines un-
constitutional by concluding that juvenile sentences could not be
treated the same as adult sentences, the court would have allowed
people who committed prior crimes to go unpunished for their recidi-
vistic ways. This group could not be distinguished based on the types
or severity of crimes committed. Rather, the only factor distinguish-
ing this group from others would be their status as juveniles at the
time they committed the crimes.
333. See supra notes 175-244 and accompanying text (discussing the circumstances under
which the trial judge may exercise his or her discretion in departing from the sentence imposed
by the Guidelines).
334. See supra note 317 (noting that juvenile status offenses are excluded under the
Guidelines).
335. Johnson, 28 F.3d at 156.
336. Id. at 157.
337. Id. However, a trial court's discretionary decision to depart from the guidelines in sen-




Fortunately, the court did not follow this course of reasoning in
Johnson. Rather than protecting this group of recidivists, the court
strengthened the power of the Guidelines to attack recidivism. The
Supreme Court in United States v. Mistretta339 had already upheld the
constitutionality of the Guidelines. The Johnson court went one step
further and upheld the specific principle under the Guidelines that
juvenile sentences may be used to enhance an adult criminal's sen-
tence.340 The Guidelines are strengthened by this decision because,
under Johnson, they can be used to keep more recidivists off the
streets. By allowing the sentence enhancement for all adult criminals,
Johnson ensures that adults who have committed previous crimes,
whether those crimes were committed as an adult or juvenile, will be
subject to longer sentences. 341
The Johnson court sent a clear message that courts will no longer
"forget" the crimes that adult criminals committed as juveniles. The
juvenile cannot continue to take advantage of the separate juvenile
system when he becomes an adult. The Guidelines do not prevent the
juveniles from enjoying any benefits the juvenile system has to offer
when they are properly under its jurisdiction. If the juvenile does not
commit any further crimes once he becomes an adult, the juvenile will
have benefited from the separate juvenile system.342 However, if that
same juvenile commits crimes as an adult, he or she should not con-
tinue to benefit from the separate juvenile system as an adult. 343 This
person would effectively receive a double benefit from the juvenile
system.
This case also represents a positive step forward for the Supreme
Court, Congress and state legislatures in treating juvenile offenders
more like criminals. As the Court in Gault recognized, a juvenile's
confinement results in a loss of his liberty.344 The juvenile is, despite
philosophical differences between the two systems, treated like an
adult criminal when it comes to confinement. 345 The Guidelines ac-
knowledge this similarity, and accordingly treat juvenile sentences vir-
339. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
340. See supra notes 232-65 and accompanying text (discussing the Johnson majority's holding
and supporting arguments concerning the use of juvenile adjudications in determining sentences
under the federal sentencing guidelines).
341. See supra notes 319-28 (discussing recidivism and the manner in which the Guidelines
justly punish the habitual criminal).
342. United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 151, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
343. Id.




tually the same as adult sentences for purposes of calculating later
sentences under the Guidelines.
It should be emphasized that the primary impact of the Johnson
decision will be on adult criminals. Although juveniles today commit
more violent crimes, and in turn, are often treated more as adult
criminals, the court's opinion in Johnson has only a minor impact on
juveniles themselves. Juvenile delinquents continue to benefit from
the juvenile system while they are minors. 346 The fact remains that
today the juvenile system is still not the exact equivalent of the adult
criminal system.347 The juvenile still has the opportunity to benefit
from the rehabilitation-oriented philosophy underlying the juvenile
courts.348 However, once that juvenile becomes an adult, he should
no longer derive the benefits of the juvenile courts. As discussed
above, society cannot afford to sweep under the rug offenses a person
commits as a juvenile when determining that person's criminal sen-
tence as an adult. 349
CONCLUSION
As the juvenile court in Chicago approaches its 100th anniver-
sary, 350 it may be time to rethink the purposes served by the juvenile
courts. The original philosophy behind the juvenile court was to reha-
bilitate the juvenile.351 The juvenile proceeding was to be considered
civil in nature and geared towards rehabilitating juveniles. However,
the actual juvenile system has unfolded quite differently, more closely
resembling the adult criminal system with each passing year. Indeed,
the Supreme Court has given juveniles almost all of the constitutional
protections given to adult criminals.
The Guidelines reinforce the important goal of punishing recidi-
vism. By including juvenile crimes in calculating a defendant's sen-
tence, the Guidelines effectively address the nature and increased
amount of juvenile crime. To deny courts the force of this provision of
346. See supra notes 74-169 and accompanying text (demonstrating that if juvenile offenders
commit no further crimes, they enjoy the benefit of having their juvenile records sealed).
347. See supra notes 292-317 and accompanying text (discussing the differences between juve-
nile and adult criminal courts).
348. See supra notes 28-31 (explaining that the original intent of the juvenile court system was
to rehabilitate, rather than punish, young offenders).
349. See supra notes 320-22 and accompanying text (discussing the growing concern over
recidivism).
350. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (noting that the juvenile system was created in
Chicago in 1899).
351. See supra notes 22-60 and accompanying text (discussing the early years of the juvenile
court system and the rehabilitative ideal underlying its creation).
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the Guidelines would be to accept the result that adults who have
committed crimes as juveniles may avoid the consequences of their
repetitive criminal behavior.
Deborah L. Mills

